The Strategy of Denial by Colby Elbridge

American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict

"Americans’ wealth, suffering, and willpower must be jealously safeguarded, not liberally spent. " pg 60

In April, I started to change my Korean studying strategy away from consuming soap operas and towards topics I was genuinely interested in, like American politics. Learning a language is tedious, and I thought consuming American political content in Korean would help expedite the learning process.

Fortunately, this strategy pays dividends not only in terms of language learning but also by introducing me to interesting political commentators like Kim Ji-Yoon, who specializes in educating the Korean public about American politics.

She has had guests such as Anthony Blinken and former President Obama, making her quite a high-profile character as far as Korean media is concerned.

While binge-watching her content, I came across an interview with Colby Elbridge, a former Defense Department Trump hire, which particularly caught my attention.

Of his claims, I was most surprised to find out that a formal Defense Department hire supported the idea of nuclear weapons proliferation among certain U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Korea. This is surprising given that the U.S. has historically been adamant and successful in preventing Korea from obtaining a nuclear weapon despite failures to prevent her Northern counterpart.

Throughout the interview, Colby expressed intense cynicism about U.S. capabilities and resolve to deal with the security threats of our time alone. His desire to encourage allies to take security into their own hands suggests that he believes the United States is unable to micromanage its allies or conduct a credible defense in China alone. His approach is one of marginal analysis, where we try to calculate a balance of power by maximizing deterrence signals through hard power while minimizing commitment by outsourcing security responsibilities to our allies.

In other interviews, such as the one he gave at the National Conservative Convention, he consistently reiterates the importance of the U.S. prioritizing all security efforts for a potential confrontation with China. He even suggests that we give up on Ukraine to do this. However, despite his anti-Chinese rhetoric, he notably does not suggest removing the Chinese Communist Party or destabilizing internal Chinese politics but rather commits to a strategy of denial through military means to thwart Chinese ambitions of hegemony.

Colby’s position is kind of a throwback to the old balance-of-power politics of the early 20th century. However, it is tempered with an interventionist skepticism that is characteristic of America First. In my view, it seems as if Cobly is trying to synthesize the isolationist sentiment that has become common among the American right with the more hawkish interventionist attitude of the established Neo-Conservative factions. 

Indeed, his position is a middle ground between the regime's hegemonic international liberalism and the populist nationalistic approach. In Colby’s view, American foreign policy needs to reflect the realities of multipolarity, which require us to restrain our involvement in conflicts that maximize our position while minimizing strength-depleting ventures. 

Elbridge calls this approach “conservative realism,” which seems like an honest attempt to integrate the somewhat incoherent sentimentalism of American First into a coherent strategic outlook. This outlook does not call for Americans to retreat from the world stage but rather for them to adopt a purposeful strategy in which the conditions of victory are well-defined and achievable. Given his general avoidance of moral histrionics and pragmatic approach, I had to learn more about Mr. Elbridge.

The Strategy of Denial

As someone who considers themselves an interventionist skeptic, I thought that reading Colby's book “The Strategy of Denial American Defense in the Age of Great Power Conflict” would help me understand an avenue to form a coherent policy position that would be consistent with America First. Too often, American First foreign policy views are polemic, offering no real substance in terms of actual policy. No matter how attractive the aesthetics of patriotism and long-winded diatribes against Neo-conservatives are to me, they still mean nothing absent well-articulated policy positions that offer a real alternative. 

The first thing Colby establishes is why the United States should be interested in East Asia, and moreover, how involvement beneftis its citizens. Too often, whether in Afghanistan or Ukraine, the U.S. justifies its actions based on grandiose claims of defending its “moral order”—such as protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan or spreading the fruits of democracy to Iraq. However, the crucial question often omitted is: How does this benefit America? How does this help the American people?

Colby has considered this concern and outlines the core criteria for evaluating American foreign policy. He argues that American policy aims to protect the "prosperity, freedom, and security" of its citizens. If the benefits of the intervention are not justified along these three dimensions, then interventionism should not be attempted. 

Did involvement in Afghanistan protect American prosperity? No. Did the Taliban threaten American freedoms? No. As far as security is concerned, the Taliban did harbor Osama Bin Laden, which justified a short and purposeful military intervention but not a two-decade-long regime change operation. In any case, the point is that despite our past failures, it doesn’t mean that interventionism of any type is destructive. If China is a threat we should confront, it should be justified across these dimensions. 

Colby makes a strong argument that all three of these goods would be threatened if China were to gain regional hegemony in Asia. The most obvious reason is that Asia is a giant market with 40% of world GDP. Allowing China to monopolize all that wealth would put the United States in a disadvantageous bargaining position. Our freedom of action concerning East Asian policy would be limited as a Chinese hegemon could push its neighbors to adopt trade policy that could go against American interests.

Given our massive stake in the Asian market, it would undoubtedly create a significant security situation if China were to coerce its neighbors into accepting its hegemony through soft power or military force. With Taiwan in everyone's minds, we need to move away from a policy of strategic ambiguity, not because it is not preferable but rather unsustainable given Chinese assertiveness.

The book criticizes strategic ambiguity in the face of an assertive China, advocating for “clearer” commitments to nations where a credible defense would be possible. Perhaps more commitments are the last thing a foreign policy skeptic wants to hear, given that we have been brought kicking and screaming into one conflict after another.

However, Colby suggests that unlike in the past, our commitments would be offered only if the potential partner was defensible and that it would deny China regional hegemony. Limited intervention is advocated to the extent that it prevents China from controlling key countries, which would allow it to have the power to pressure other nations into “Bandwagoning .”

Bandwagoning in this context would entail nations in the Indo-Pacific choosing submission to Chinese hegemony over forming an anti-hegemonic coalition with the U.S. China's best strategy, according to Colby, is to fracture U.S.-led coalition members or prospective members by isolating and subjugating them without activating a coordinated response.

As it relates to Taiwan, the best strategy for China could be to attempt a "fait accompli," where it seizes territory and fortifies its position, making it too costly or risky for opponents to reverse the gains. This approach exploits the difficulty and reluctance of coalition members to engage in a counteroffensive, particularly when their interests are less directly threatened. This strategy could be particularly effective against the U.S., as it leverages local military superiority and the asymmetry of interests among coalition members.

Indeed, the U.S. interests threatened by the erasure of Taiwan’s sovereignty are nowhere near as important as it is for China to control its backyard. If a regional war occurs, there is a strong likelihood of attrition on the part of the U.S. as the differential in resolve becomes more acute. Take Ukraine for example. Although it was essential for the U.S. to support Ukraine, it has become clear now that our commitment to Ukraine is not as strong as Russia's desire to occupy it. 

Unfortunately for Congress, efforts to pressure social media companies into changing their terms of service to combat disinformation will not magically generate public resolve for engaging in distant conflicts where victory is dubious. Propaganda alone cannot sustain a strategy that demands greater resolve. However, if we develop a focused strategy that specifically targets China's 'fait accompli' approach, the U.S. could win a conflict without becoming too deeply involved.

In this denial approach, the success of China's strategy hinges on two key conditions: seizing the target state's key territory and maintaining control over it despite potential counterattacks. A denial defense seeks to thwart these objectives by either preventing the initial seizure of territory or, if the territory is seized, by ensuring that the attacker cannot hold it.

There are two primary options for implementing a denial defense. The first option is to deny the attacker’s ability to seize key territory in the first place. This can be achieved by destroying or disabling the attacker’s forces before they reach the target area. The second option comes into play if the attacker manages to seize the territory. In such cases, the defenders must focus on preventing the attacker from consolidating control, which can be done by quickly halting the attacker's progress and reversing their gains before they can secure the territory.

The denial strategy also has the advantage of shifting the burden of escalation onto China, which in turn increases the likelihood that U.S. resolve and coalition cohesion will be maintained throughout the conflict.

How to Keep the War limited

To maintain a limited war through a denial defense, the United States could clearly communicate that any offensive actions against mainland China would only occur if China directly engages in or supports attacks against Taiwan or operates within a specific geographical area around Taiwan. This strategy aims to avoid escalating the conflict beyond the immediate area of contention.

In the event of a vertical escalation, such as China resorting to nuclear weapons to turn the tide in its favor, it would mark a significant and unprecedented breach of international norms, as it would be the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945. Such an action would likely provoke severe global condemnation and increase pressure on the U.S. and its allies to counter China effectively. This action could encourage states like India and Thailand to take a more openly pro-American position, further isolating China. 

Horizontal escalation, such as China expanding its conflict to involve other neighboring countries, would not be beneficial in this scenario either. If China faces failure in its initial invasion of Taiwan and attempts to extend the conflict to its neighbors, it would only further isolate China diplomatically and economically. Such actions would likely alienate other countries, exacerbate regional tensions, and strengthen the international coalition against China. This would make China's strategic situation even more precarious and would not alleviate its difficulties in achieving its objectives in Taiwan.

In practice, neither horizontal nor vertical escalation is likely to significantly change China's situation. Taiwan is vitally important to China, but it is not existential. Escalation in such high-stakes scenarios usually reinforces the existing situation rather than achieving a decisive victory. Consequently, China would be better off avoiding brinkmanship and maintaining its current posture rather than risking nuclear armageddon.

 It must be emphasized that, in attempting to coerce China to terminate the war, the defenders would need to demand no more of China than that Beijing accepts its failure to subordinate Taiwan and cease hostile efforts to subordinate it or any other US ally within the coalition.

This means foreign policy hawks have to restrain their desire to see regime change in China or attempt to permanently isolate them from the market like Iran. Unfortunately, people like Lindsey Graham and his ilk are still very influential in American politics. Fortunately, it seems the tide is turning, and war skepticism is increasing.

Back to Reality

I agree with the book's central premise. We ought to confront China seriously but avoid simultaneously pursuing a multi-threatened dominance strategy. Preventing China from gaining hegemony is all that is required. Anything more invites unwanted trouble.

I am skeptical that a fait accompli could be entirely prevented, as it would require significant commitment from Taiwan and direct support from the U.S., both of which seem lacking. With Taiwan’s current level of defense spending, it is unlikely to fend off a full-scale invasion. Furthermore, a recent poll revealed that only 30% of Americans believe the U.S. should defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, while 68% think the U.S. should prioritize increasing its own military spending.

Colby’s strategy acknowledges the relative lack of U.S. resolve compared to China, but the current level of commitment does not inspire confidence in its success. Taiwan must demonstrate greater dedication to its own defense to convince the West of its seriousness. Ukraine's bravery and determined defense against Russia, against all odds, have shown the West that Ukraine is fully committed to its sovereignty. Unfortunately, dislodging Russian forces from Ukraine was and remains impossible, given the harsh strategic realities. Nonetheless, this underscores the importance of supporting Taiwan, as preventing a beachhead on a defensible island is decisively within the realm of possibility.

To Taiwan credit its cabinet did recently announce that defense spending for 2025 will increase by 7.7% to T$647 billion ($20.25 billion), accounting for 2.45% of GDP, up from 2.38% this year. The spending includes a special budget of T$90.4 billion for new fighter jets and missile production, part of a five-year, T$240 billion military upgrade plan announced in 2021. Hsieh Chi-hsien, head of the Defense Ministry's comptroller bureau, stated that the goal is to eventually reach 3% of GDP for defense spending, with a steady increase based on Taiwan's needs, avoiding an arms race with other countries.

This is positive news, but a 'steady' increase in defense spending may not be enough to prevent a full-scale invasion from China. Taiwan must focus on neutralizing China's ability to launch an invasion in the early stages of a conflict to preserve its independence. If China were to establish a beachhead in Taiwan and secure supply lines for its forces, it would only be a matter of time before Taiwan is forced to capitulate.

Given China's rapid naval buildup, it is absolutely vital for the U.S. to divert or invest more military spending in our navy to increase deterrence in the region. At the same time, the U.S. must push Taiwan to take its defense more seriously in proportion to China's increasingly bold escalations.

China is serious, given all the evidence. I encourage all of you who are skeptical to read about the Chinese naval buildup for yourselves. We should not fool ourselves into thinking that China is bluffing.

References:

Palmer, Alexander, et al. “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup.” Www.csis.org, 5 June 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup.

“Poll: American Foreign Policy Views - Defense Priorities.” Defense Priorities, 16 July 2024, www.defensepriorities.org/polls/american-foreign-policy-views/. Accessed 3 Sept. 2024.

Sacks, David. “Taiwan Announced a Record Defense Budget: But Is It Enough to Deter China?” Council on Foreign Relations, 30 Aug. 2023, www.cfr.org/blog/taiwan-announced-record-defense-budget-it-enough-deter-china.

“Tracking China’s Naval Modernization at Key Shipyards.” ChinaPower Project, chinapower.csis.org/analysis/china-naval-modernization-jiangnan-hudongzhonghua-shipyard/.